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CREATING DISINCENTIVES TO NEGOTIATE:
MITCHELL V. M.N.R.'S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Shin Imai*
The Supreme Court of Canada has often encouraged the
Crown and Aboriginal parties to find negotiated solutions to
their disputes. The complex social, political, economic and legal
interests which are embedded in many sectors of the Canadian
population are not best resolved in the context of legal proceed-
ings. Courts should, however, do more than lament the lack of
negotiations - they should make decisions that create incentives
for high quality, effective dispute resolution processes. This article
describes the framework for negotiation set out in R. v. Sparrow
(on Aboriginal rights to fish), Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
(on Aboriginal title to lands) and Marshall v. Canada (on treaty
rights to fish). Those cases would provide incentives for the par-
ties to negotiate. By contrast, in the case of Mitchell v. M.N.R.
(exemption from duty on border crossing), the two judgments of
the Supreme Court turn on the interpretation ofhistory and the
incompatibility with Canadian sovereignty. While it is not
inappropriate to take those factors into account, the Court sets
those up as threshold issues that need to be resolved before the
Court would consider how to balance Aboriginal rights with
Crown infringements. Unfortunately, the approach used in
Mitchell will provide disincentives to negotiate workable accom-
modationsfor contemporary problems.
La Cour Supreme du Canada a souvent incit! la Couronne
et les parties autochtones i rigler leurs diffirends par voie de
negociation. Vu la complexiti des questions sociales, politiques,
iconomiques et juridiques ainsi que les intdrits entrelacis de
nombreux secteurs de la population canadienne, ce n 'estpas dans
le contexte dinstances judiciaires que l'on peut le mieux les
re'gler. Toutefois, les tribunaux devraient faire plus que simple-
ment inciter - ils devraient faire des decisions qui motivent des
ngociations efficaces de haute qualit. Cet article dicrit
l'approche aux negociationsproposee dans R. c. Sparrow, Delga-
muukw c. La Colombie britannique et R. c. Marshall et dtmon-
tre la fafon dont ces causes motiveraient les parties a nigocier.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Formerly counsel responsible for ADR policy
and Aboriginal issues at the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. I wish to thank the fol-
lowing people for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper: Kathy Laird,
Sonia Lawrence, Julie Macfarlane, Brian Slattery and Kerry Wilkins.
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Par contraste, la cause Mitchell c. M.R.N. concentre exclusive-
ment sur linterprltation de lhistoire et la compatibiliti avec la
souveraineti canadienne. Quoiqu'il ne soit pas inopportun de
tenir compte de ces facteurs, le Tribunal en fait des points az
rlgler au dipart avant que le Tribunal ne consid~re comment
.iquilibrer les droits autochtones et les violations de la Couronne.
Malheureusement, rapproche utiliste en l'esp~ce ddcouragera les
nigociations visant h trouver des accommodements pratiques
pour des problmes contemporains.
The initial trial in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia lasted almost three years,
involved 374 hearing days, 35,000 pages of transcripts, 50,000 pages of exhibits
and resulted in a judgment of more than 400 pages. It was eleven years between
the beginning of the trial and the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 1998,
which sent the case back to be retried. As of November 2003, the issues being
litigated between the parties remain unresolved.
In his decision in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. stated:
... this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only in eco-
nomic but in human terms as well. By ordering a new trial, I do not
necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to litigation and to set-
tle their dispute through the courts. As was said in Sparrow, [cita-
tions omitted] s.35() "provides a solid constitutional base upon
which subsequent negotiations can take place." Those negotiations
should also include other Aboriginal nations, which have a stake in
the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not
a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good
faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good
faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of
this Court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, [citia-
tions omitted], to be a basic purpose of s.35(l) - "the reconciliation
of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of
the Crown." Let us face it, we are all here to stay. I
This passage expresses an aspiration for a more collaborative relationship
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, one that involves "good faith" and
"give and take." It is an aspiration that has been voiced by judges from all levels
of court and for good reason. 2 Conflicts involving Aboriginal peoples are so
I Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 186 [Delgamuukw]. Section
35(1), Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,c.1 1 reads as
follows:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed.
2 For a recent case in relation to the rights of Mdtis, see R. v. Powley (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 35
(Ont. C.A.)which found that a member of the Mris in Sault Ste. Marie Ontario had an Aborig-
inal right to hunt for food. Sharpe, J.A., (McMurtry C.J.O., Abella, J.A. concurring) was critical
of the province's historical failure to negotiate with the M~tis. He states, at para. 166:
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complex, there are so many parties affected, and the potential consequences are
so great, it is clearly preferable to have matters resolved in a negotiation process
that would address a wide spectrum of public and private interests.
3
While judicial support for negotiated settlements is very strong, court deci-
sions have not always helped to create appropriate conditions for productive
negotiations. Some decisions have had the effect of discouraging the parties
from returning to the negotiating table or have encouraged negotiations over
the wrong issues.
This paper begins with a discussion of how the development of the substan-
tive law on Aboriginal and treaty rights makes negotiations necessary for resolv-
ing such disputes. It will then review the role that the courts can play in
providing the conditions necessary for productive negotiations. 4 The paper con-
While the Interim Enforcement Policy contemplates negotiations with
the Mtis community, I fail to see how a bald promise that has not been
acted on can justify limiting a constitutional right. As I have already noted,
efforts to negotiate an agreement have been sporadic at best. I do not accept
that uncertainty about identifying those entitled to assert Mdtis rights can
be accepted as a justification for denying the right. The appellant has led no
evidence to show that it has made a serious effort to deal with the question
of Mdtis rights .... The basic position of the government seems to have been
simply to deny that these rights exist, absent a decision from the courts to
the contrary. While I do not doubt that there has been considerable uncer-
tainty about the nature and scope of M~tis rights, this is hardly a reason to
deny their existence. There is an element of uncertainty about most broadly
worded constitutional rights. The government cannot simply sit on its
hands and then defend its inaction because the nature of the right or the
identity of the bearers of the right is uncertain. The appellant failed to sat-
isfy the trial judge, the Superior Court judge on appeal, and has failed to sat-
isfy me that it has made any serious effort to come to grips with the question
of Mtis hunting rights.
The Court ordered a stay of one year in order to provide an orderly transition and to facilitate nego-
tiations. In spite ofthe court's sharp criticism, the provincial Crown decided to appeal the decision
to the Supreme Court of Canada. The province was unsuccessful as the Supreme Court found that
the province had infringed the Mtis right to hunt for food. (R. v. Powley 2003 SCC 43).
3 The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples has recommended the establishment of a dispute
resolution process involving specialized tribunals and commissions which would promote nego-
tiation and mediation for disputes involving Aboriginal land and treaties: Canada, Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal People: Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: Canada Commu-
nications Group, 1996) at 591-613.
4 I develop the relationship between the courts and negotiation more fully in "Sound Science,
Careful Policy Analysis and On-going Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in
Aboriginal Lands and Resources Disputes," (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L. J. (forthcoming). In
that article, I describe four roles for the courts: establishing a negotiation framework and rights
parameters; determining the relationship between negotiation and adjudication utilizing princi-
ples of dispute system design; ensuring the integrity of the negotiation process; and providing
limited review of completed agreements. In the present article, I focus on the first of the four
roles: establishing a framework and rights parameters for negotiations. In this paper, I do not
focus on legitimate criticisms of the substance of the Court's decisions. One of the troublesome
aspects is the lack of sufficient analysis for the assumption of Crown sovereignty which leads to
problems in Mitchell discussed infta at notes 38-40 and accompanying text. For a critique of
the bald assumption of Crown sovereignty, see J. Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy. An Analysis
of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia", (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L. J. 537.
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cludes with a discussion of Mitchell v. M.N.R, which could work against the
negotiating framework developed in R. v. Sparrow.6 Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia7 and R. v. Marshall.
8
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF COURT DECISIONS
Courts have traditionally articulated substantive rights and obligations by
applying general rules to specific disputes. As Owen Fiss has said, the function
of the courts is to "explicate and give force to the values embodied in authorita-
tive texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them... " 9 In the context of the law in relation to
Aboriginal people, the Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to approach
section 35(1) with sympathy and vision, developing creative approaches to lim-
iting Crown authority, interpreting treaty rights, and paving the way for new
constitutional arrangements. However, the nature of these disputes and the way
that the law has developed make it difficult to formulate general rules that will
provide specific guidance in future cases.
The histories of the Aboriginal peoples and the Crown governments
involved vary from region to region and the resolution of disputes often require
delicate balancing of competing local interests. Given the large number of vari-
ables in each case, it is understandable that courts go to some lengths to restrict
the scope of their decisions to the particular facts under consideration, fearing
that judgments which are pitched at too general a level may have unintended
consequences.
As a result, before a court can address whether a particular activity in dispute
is constitutionally protected as an Aboriginal or treaty right, the court must
look carefully at the historical and contemporary situation to determine
whether there is a protected right at all. In this respect, the court's task is differ-
ent than, let us say, a proceeding involving speeding on a highway. In a speeding
case, the court would simply determine the factual issue - what was the speed of
the motor vehicle? The legal standard - the speed limit - would not be in
doubt. In the area of Aboriginal and treaty rights, however, the legal standard -
the scope of the Aboriginal or treaty right - must be determined anew with each
new set of factual circumstances. In other words, the equivalent of the "speed
limit" can change from case to case.
The problem is illustrated in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in k
v. Van der Peet.l0 Dorothy Van der Peet was charged for selling ten salmon with-
out having a commercial fishing licence. In her defence, she claimed that she
did not require a licence because she had an Aboriginal right to sell the fish. The
5 Mitchellv. MN.P,, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [Mitchell].
6 P, v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow].
7 Supra note 1.
8 R v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [Marshalll], reconsideration refused, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533
(Marshall I1].
9 Owen Fiss, "Against Settlement", (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073.
10 z . Vander Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
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Court disagreed, finding that there was not enough historical evidence from
pre-contact times to establish the existence of an Aboriginal right to sell fish. In
coming to this conclusion, Lamer C.J. stated,
To characterize an applicant's claim correctly, a court should con-
sider such factors as the nature of the action which the applicant is
claiming was done pursuant to an aboriginal right, the nature of the
governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the
tradition, custom or practice being relied upon to establish the
right.lI
In order to consider all of these factors, an intimidating number of permuta-
tions need to be taken into account, with the result that the nature of Aborigi-
nal or treaty rights can vary considerably from case to case. For example, an
Aboriginal "right to fish" may be for food only (R. v. Sparrow'2), for commer-
cial purposes (R. v. Gladstone3), or for "moderate livelihood" (R.v. Jones14).
The difficulty in articulating a clear and precise definition of an Aboriginal
or treaty right - one that could be applied to other fact situations - is com-
pounded by the second feature of litigation in this area. Even after an Aborigi-
nal or treaty right is established, the Crown has an opportunity to introduce
evidence to justify infringements of that right. The power to infringe is set out
in Sparrow. In that case, a member of the Musqueam First Nation was charged
under the Fisheries Act 15 for fishing with a net that was longer than that autho-
rized in the regulations. He fought the charge on the basis that the legislation
interfered with his Aboriginal right to fish for food in his traditional territory.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that there was an Aboriginal right to
fish for food and held that legislation which interfered with that right could be
struck down. However, the Court also held that the Crown could justify
infringing the Aboriginal right through legislation by satisfying a two stage test.
In the first stage, the Crown is required to establish that there is a "compel-
ling and substantial" objective for the legislation, such as the need to conserve
the resource. In the second stage, the Crown is required to show that it is acting
honourably in a way that is consistent with the Crown's fiduciary relationship
with Aboriginal peoples. Among the questions to ask at this second stage are the
following:
11 Ibid. at para. 53. See also R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 at para.27:
The appellants themselves would have this Court characterize their claim as
to "a broad right to manage the use of their reserve lands". To so characterize
the appellants' claim would be to cast the Court's inquiry at a level of exces-
sive generality. Aboriginal rights, including any asserted right to self-govern-
ment, must be looked at in light of the specific circumstances of each case
and, in particular, in light of the specific history and culture of the aborigi-
nal group claiming the right.
12 Sparrow, supra note 6.
13 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723.
14 R. v. Jones, (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 421, [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 182 (Ont. Prov.Ct.).
15 Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14. ss. 34, 61(1).
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... whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order
to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation,
fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in
question has been consulted with respect to the conservation mea-
sures being implemented.
16
If the Crown fails to satisfy the Court on any of these matters, the legislation
would not be upheld. For example, a court could conduct an ex post facto review
of the adequacy of consultation, which occurred before the challenged Crown
decision was made. Even if Crown legislation were found to be justified on all
other grounds, a failure to consult prior to the Crown's decision may nullify the
validity of an action taken pursuant to the legislation.
17
What complicates matters in this justification stage is the fact that the basis
for justification can change from case to case. As the Supreme Court of Canada
pointed out in Marshall II, in relation to a commercial fishing right of
Mi'kmaq, justification for infringing an Aboriginal or treaty right in one set of
circumstances will not necessarily apply in a different set of circumstances:
The factual context, as this case shows, is of great importance, and
the merits of the government's justification may vary from resource
to resource, species to species, community to community and time
to time.
18
To return to the analogy of the speed limit, the process for deciding on the
scope of an Aboriginal or treaty right might be compared to determining the
applicable speed limit depending on the colour of the vehicle, how important
the vehicle was to the passengers, how long the vehicle had been driven on that
stretch of the highway, who else was using the road and whether the speed limit
was discussed with all parties before opening the highway. There are so many
variables that a decision on the speed limit in one set of circumstances can
always be arguably different in another set of circumstances.
What courts can do to counter this problem is to establish a framework,
which would encourage parties to negotiate in a broad spectrum of cases. The
existence of such a framework could assist in resolving a larger number of future
disputes than would be possible from court decisions on substantive rights
alone. Elements of such a framework are found in Sparrow'9, Delgamuukw2 °
and the two Marshall decisions2 .
16 Sparrow, supra, note 6 at 1119.
17 See Halivay River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1999), 64 B.C.L.R. (3d)
206, [19991 9 WWR. 645, [19991 4 C.N.L.RI. (C.A.), at para. 167. Finch J.A., found that the
proposed logging would infringe hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by the treaty. He found
that the infringement was justified, but that the failure of the Crown to consult adequately was
fatal.
18 Marshall I, supra note 8 at para. 22.
19 Sparrow, supra note 6.
20 Delgamuukw, supra note 1.
21 Supra note 8.
Vol 22 Creating Disincentives to Negotiate 315
II. SPARROW, DELGAMUUKW, AND MARSHALL:
THE NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
The success of a negotiation process depends, in part, on what the parties
perceive as the critical issues that need to be resolved. Court decisions can influ-
ence the content of the negotiations by identifying the key issues and determin-
ing the parameters within which an agreement must be achieved if litigation is
to be avoided. For example, as I discuss below, a court's identification of the key
factors in deciding a dispute over the payment of custom duties will influence
the content of future negotiations between the Crown and First Nations on
other issues. This relationship between judicial determinations and negotiations
can enhance the overall process for resolving Aboriginal and treaty rights dis-
putes and the likelihood of negotiation success if both the parties and the courts
develop an appreciation of how the two processes can be used creatively to com-
plement each other.
22
A. Interest Based Negotiations: Focus on Interests, Not Positions
Modern day negotiation practice has drifted away from old-style bargaining.
In the old system, the parties approached the table with inflated demands and
worked for hard fought trade-offs. A successful resolution was said to be one
where both parties felt equally unhappy. With the movement toward a new way
of resolving conflicts, crystallized in the publication of Getting to Yes,23 the pur-
pose of dispute resolution has become the crafting of "win-win" solutions. The
objective is not to crush the other party - the objective is to identify what each
party wants out of the negotiation (their "interests") and to try to accommodate
the interests of both parties. In this approach, parties are discouraged from dig-
ging into inflexible "positions" which they defend against the attacks of their
adversaries.
To apply this approach to negotiations between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples is easier said than done. The parties typically arrive with little common
ground. The Crown, often alarmed at the "unreasonable" demands of the First
Nation, approaches the table thinking it must "lower expectations." The
Aboriginal parties, frustrated by the "colonial mentality" of the Crown, feel that
they must "educate" the Crown's representatives. In addition, whether negotia-
tions conducted using the Fisher and Ury approach is appropriate in Aboriginal
22 In this paper, I am not addressing the need for courts themselves to engage in more dispute res-
olution, through pre-hearings and so on. In my view, courts continue to have an important
function in making decisions. I am addressing how this decision-making function is exercised
by the judiciary, not how courts can avoid making decisions by making access to hearings more
difficult.
As well, I should make clear that in this paper, I do not focus on the assessment of the sub-
stance of some of the Court's reasons. For example, in my view, the Court's failure to question
the basis for Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal people leads to problems in Mitchell discussed
infra at notes 43-45 and accompanying text. For a critique of the bald assumption of Crown
sovereignty, see J. Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia", (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L. J. 537.
23 R.Fisher, W Ury & B. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2nd ed.
(New York: Penguin, 1991).
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disputes is itself contested. Mark Doxtator, an Aboriginal lawyer, at that time
with the Indian Claims Commission, argued that "principled" negotiations and
mediation are based on principles, which are not those of Aboriginal society.
24
In his view, Aboriginal people value on-going understandings more than static
agreements.
... it is important to understand that in contrast to the Western system
of dispute resolution, which attempts to arrive at an "agreement," the
Aboriginal approach strives to achieve an "understanding."25
While the courts cannot resolve all of the challenges to conducting effective
negotiations, they can help increase the likelihood of success in two ways. One
way is to establish objective standards and precedents to guide the parties. How-
ever, as pointed out above, there are limits to the extent that aggressive law-mak-
ing can remedy the problems at negotiating tables regarding Aboriginal issues.
Courts have found it very difficult to make decisions, which are broad enough to
apply appropriately to situations outside of the particular facts of the case.
26
A second way that courts could create the conditions for fruitful negotiations
is by ensuring that there are incentives to engage in negotiations, which focus
on arriving at workable accommodations rather than focussing on inflexible
positions. This objective can be met by creating the expectation that the Crown
would routinely bring evidence of justification before the courts.
B. The requirement for justifying infringements of Aboriginal and
treaty rights
The Supreme Court of Canada established the broad outlines of a frame-
work for negotiations in Sparrow27. Part I of this paper described the Sparrow
test, which provided that once a practice was found to be an Aboriginal right, it
could only be infringed if the Crown could justify the infringement. Part of the
justification involved prior consultation, which would enhance the possibility
of negotiations before litigation.
In Delgamuukw, the Court followed the Sparrow framework. First, it laid out
broad parameters for the incidents of Aboriginal title, finding that such title
24 UVic Institute for Dispute Resolution, Making Peace and Sharing Power: A National Gathering
on Aboriginal Peoples and Dispute Resolution (Victoria: University of Victoria, 1997) at 170.
25 Ibid. at 168.
26 See J. Jai, Negotiated vs. Judge-made Aboriginal Law: Bridging the Two Solitudes (LL.M. Thesis,
University of Toronto Law School, 2000) [unpublished] at 117. Jai, a former negotiator for the
Yukon Government, feels that the Delgamuukw decision delayed negotiations in the Yukon by
being too ambitious in its scope and too vague in its detail.
While the ambiguity of the decision and the ensuing legal uncertainty may
encourage parties to negotiate, the vagueness of the decision does not assist
parties once they are at the negotiating table. Since the court's principles are
set out in the abstract, with little guidance as to how they might apply in a
specific fact situation, parties with different interests and perspectives are
free to interpret the decision as they wish.
27 Sparrouw supra note 6.
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encompassed "exclusive use" of the land for a variety of purposes. 28 The Court
also provided a broad basis for Crown infringements of Aboriginal title, includ-
ing "the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations."
29
The decision is structured in a way that makes it difficult for either the Crown
or the First Nation to avoid taking into account the interests of the other party.
If a First Nation simply focuses on the existence of Aboriginal title and ignores
possible grounds for Crown infringements, the First Nation would risk having a
court find that broad infringements by the Crown were justified. If the Crown
simply denies the existence of Aboriginal title and ignores the necessity of justi-
fying the infringement, the Crown would risk having a court recognize the
existence of Aboriginal title. If that were to happen the Crown would not have
any justified legislation in place to limit the exercise of the Aboriginal right.30 In
fact, the Crown found itself in this position after failing to provide evidence of
justification for infringement in the Marshall3' case.
Donald Marshall was charged with selling $787.10 worth of eels without
having a commercial fishing licence. Marshall claimed that his right to sell the
fish was protected by a mid-eighteenth century peace treaty between the
Mi'kmaq and the British. Although the written version of the treaty did not
28 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 117:
... Aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of
the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not
be aspects of those Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are
integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures.
29 Ibid. at para. 165:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydro-
electric power, the general economic development of the interior of British
Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the build-
ing of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support
those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose
and, in principle, can justify the infringement of Aboriginal title. Whether a
particular measure or government act can be explained by reference to one
of those objectives, however, is ultimately a question of fact that will have to
be examined on a case-by-case basis.
30 1 should note that, while the case does create a balance, in my view, the breadth of the grounds
for infringing the right tips the balance too far in favour of the Crown. See S. Imai, "Treaty
Lands and Crown Obligations: The 'Tracts Taken Up' Provision" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J. I at
17-20.
The Court clearly sees the results of these negotiations encompassing not only traditional pri-
orities but also modern uses of the land, citing oil extraction as an example of such a case. See
Delgamuukw, supra note I at para. 117:
... I have arrived at the conclusion that the content of Aboriginal
title can be summarized by two propositions: first, that Aboriginal
title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the
land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need
not be aspects of those Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions
which are integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures; and second,
that those protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature
of the group's attachment to that land.
31 MarshallI, supra note 8.
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specifically mention a right to fish, there was documentary evidence that the
negotiations leading to the treaty had considered the economic viability of the
Mi'kmaq economy. Binnie J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada, interpreted the treaty in its historical context and held that its signifi-
cance in the context of modern day Nova Scotia was to recognize a right for
Marshall to sell the eels for a "moderate livelihood." 32 Following the Sparrow
test, the Court turned to the issue of justification for the licence requirement.
The Crown, however, had not negotiated and did not submit any arguments on
justification. 33 The Court overturned the conviction and entered an acquittal.
Following the decision, Aboriginal people in the Maritimes began to assert
rights in forestry and lobster fishing. The violence, which followed, was very
troubling. However, I believe that in order to encourage negotiations, which
would prevent violence in the long run, the Court was required to make a hard
decision in the specific case before it. As a result of that decision, the Crown was
forced to engage in extensive negotiations. While some press reports leave the
impression that the decision caused chaos, in fact, agreements were concluded
with the vast majority of First Nations in the region.
34
At a subsequent hearing in this matter,35 the Court was urged to find that it
would be too difficult to have trials that dealt with both the existence of a treaty
right and the issue of justification. Counsel argued that the Crown should be
given the opportunity to introduce evidence of justification in a separate pro-
ceeding after the existence of the Aboriginal right had been confirmed by the
Court. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this submission. In my view,
this was the correct conclusion. If the Crown had attempted to accommodate
the interests of the Mi'kmaq before the litigation (as is required under the Spar-
row test), the evidence of justification would have been easy to present to the
Court. Even if negotiations were not possible before the charge was laid, there
were thirteen years between the charge and the hearing before the Supreme
Court. Instead of engaging in interest-based negotiations, however, the Crown
pursued the "winner take all" strategy of asserting its position that no treaty
rights existed. Consequently, when the Court affirmed the existence of the
right, the Crown was left with nothing to say about justification.
The three cases discussed in this Part - Sparrow, Delgamuukw, and Marshall
- set out important elements of the negotiation framework. Sparrow establishes
the basic balance between recognition of Aboriginal rights, which would over-
ride federal and provincial legislation, and the Crown's right to infringe those
rights. By requiring prior consultation, Sparrow attempted to guide the parties
32 Ibid. at para. 59.
33 Ibid. at para. 66.
34 See "The Federal Deal" CBCNews (August, 2000), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
The chaos caused by the Marshall decision, sent the Department of Fisheries
and Oceans scrambling to work out interim agreements with the 34 native
bands affected by the Supreme Court ruling. Within a week of the violence
in Burnt Church, N.B., in October 1999, all but two of the bands agreed to
a self-imposed, 30-day moratorium on fishing.
See also L. I. Rotman, "My Hovercraft is Full of Eels: Smoking Out the Message in R. v. Mar-
shalt', (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 617.
35 Marshall, supra note 8.
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toward negotiations. Delgamuukw further developed the framework by encour-
aging negotiations based on a broad articulation of Aboriginal title and a broad
view of appropriate grounds for infringing that title. Finally, Marshall strength-
ened the incentives for the Crown to negotiate by requiring that evidence of jus-
tification be introduced in the same proceeding as the challenge to the existence
of an Aboriginal or treaty right. These cases established a reasonable framework
for negotiation that should be given a chance to be implemented. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's decision in Mitchell could make the negotiating tables irrele-
vant and encourage litigation.
III. MITCHELL: FOCUS ON POSITIONS, NOT INTERESTS
Akwesasne is a Mohawk reserve which straddles the Canada-U.S.A. border.
In 1988, Grand Chief Mike Mitchell crossed from the American part of the
reserve to the Canadian part of the reserve with one washing machine, 10 blan-
kets, 20 Bibles, various articles of used clothing, one case of lubricating motor
oil, 10 loaves of bread, two pounds of butter, four gallons of whole milk, six
bags of cookies and 12 cans of soup. He reported the items to Canadian cus-
toms officials, but he refused to pay the assessed duty of $142.88 on these
goods. He claimed that, as a Mohawk, he had Aboriginal rights and rights
under the Jay Treaty, 1794 to pass across the border without paying duty.
Chief Mitchell's claim was successful at the Federal Court, Trial Division,
where McKeown J. found that the Mohawks had an existing Aboriginal right
for the following activities:
... to pass and repass freely across what is now the Canada-United
States boundary including the right to bring goods from the United
States into Canada for personal and community use without having
to pay customs duties on those goods.... The aboriginal right
includes the right to bring these goods from the United States into
Canada for non-commercial scale trade with other First Nations.
36
The Crown appealed, but lost again at the Federal Court of Appeal which
upheld the existence of an Aboriginal right, although on slightly narrower
grounds. This Court restricted the purchase of goods to New York State (rather
than throughout the United States) to coincide roughly with pre-contact
Mohawk territory. The destination of the trade with First Nations was also
restricted to Ontario or Quebec (rather than across Canada).37
The Crown appealed again to the Supreme Court of Canada, this time with
success. There were two judgments - the majority judgment was written by
Chief Justice McLachlin and a concurring decision was written by Mr. Justice
Binnie. As I will show below, both judgments discourage interest-based negotia-
tions and neither decision will bring information to the Court on the possibili-
ties of workable accommodations.
36 Mitchellv. M.N.R., [199714 C.N.L.R. 103 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 299.
37 Mitchell v. MN.R. [1999] 1 C.N.L.R 112 (EC.A.) at para. 14, per Sexton, J.A., (Isaac, C.J.
concurring). Utourneau J.A. would have narrowed the right further, restricting the goods to the
community of Akwesasne alone (at para.56).
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A. Focus on historical evidence
McLachlin C.J. relied on historical evidence presented in the trial court
about a situation, which existed over four hundred years ago. She conceded that
there was ample evidence that "trade was a central, distinguishing feature of the
Iroquois in general and the Mohawks in particular."38 However, she found that
the evidence at trial only supported east-west trade in what is now New York
State. Disagreeing with the two courts below, she found that there was insuffi-
cient evidence of Mohawk north-south trade across the St. Lawrence.
The difficulty with her approach is that, when attempting to recreate history
from pre-contact times, the paucity of evidence is not the only problem. The
very attempt to fix a historical truth with precision is fraught with difficulty.
The significance of historical events can change over time and can be affected
by the contemporary lens through which those events are interpreted. The indi-
cia of societal importance today may not apply to societal importance in pre-
contact Aboriginal society.39 This is not to say that history is irrelevant, as it is
the knowledge of history (or lack of such knowledge) that informs the positions
of the negotiating parties. From a dispute resolution perspective, however, a
process which relies exclusively on a reading of history to determine the resolu-
tion of a contemporary dispute over tax-free border crossing would not be con-
ducive to reaching negotiated agreements. This is because future disputants
would prepare for negotiations by pouring resources into research to establish
the existence of particular historical contexts leading to negotiations, which
could become mired in the exchange of expert opinions.
40
Negotiations which are successfully concluded, such as the Nisga'a Agree-
ment41 , are focussed almost entirely on setting out the contemporary social,
economic, legal, and political links between the First Nation and the Crown
governments. There is very little attempt to establish detailed agreements on
historical events. It stands to reason that courts could make a more useful con-
tribution to the ultimate resolution of these disputes by focussing, not only on
a fair assessment of historical practices, but also directly on the contemporary
issues in dispute. The effect of this shift in judicial emphasis would be to
encourage negotiations between First Nations and Crowns over contemporary
accommodations.
42
38 Mitchell, supra, note 5 at para. 41.
39 See J. Borrows, "Listening for Change: The Courts and Oral Tradition" (2001) 39 Osgoode
Hall L.J. I and J. Fortune "Construing Delgamuuku. Legal Argument, Historical Argumenta-
tion and the Philosophy of History" (1993) 51 UT. Fac. L. Rev. 80.
40 Fisher and Ury, supra note 23 at 53: "You satisfy your interests better if you talk about where
you would like to go, rather than where you come from."
41 The Nisga 'a FinalAgreement on line at <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/> (accessed Octo-
ber 2, 2003).
42 See M. Asch and C. Bell "Definition and Interpretation of Fact in Canadian Aboriginal Title
Litigation: An Analysis of Delgamuukw" (1994) 19 Queen's L. J. 503 at 549-550:
Recognizing the difficulty associated with reconstructing the past, it is per-
haps more appropriate to focus on results that promote the contemporary
ethics of co-existence and equality, rather than on legal rights based on his-
torical fact.
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B. Focus on incompatibility with Canadian sovereignty
The concurring judgment of Binnie J. in Mitchell could also drive Aborigi-
nal-Crown negotiations away from the exploration of concrete accommoda-
tions and instead encourage bargaining over abstract positions. The judge
characterized the Mohawk claim as one for international trade and mobility
arising out of citizenship in the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. This, he con-
cluded, was incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.
... the [Mohawks'] claim relates to national interests that all of us
have in common rather than to distinctive interests that for some
purposes differentiate an aboriginal community. In my view, recon-
ciliation of these interests in this particular case favours an affirma-
tion of our collective sovereignty.
43
He suggested that once sovereign incompatibility was established, there could
be no Aboriginal right recognized in the Constitution. Consequently, in his
view, it was not necessary to inquire into the existence of historical trade across
the St. Lawrence. The difficulty with his reasoning is that it turns on what it
means to be incompatible with "the historical attributes of Canadian sover-
eignty," or "a national interest that we all have in common." Such concepts are,
by their nature, hard to define, and highly dependent on context. Binnie J., for
example, concludes that "control over the mobility of persons and goods intoS ,44
one country is, and always has been, a fundamental attribute of sovereignty."
However, this abstract statement does not say whether any specific proposal to
cross the border without paying duty is incompatible with sovereignty. Binnie J.
could not be objecting to the principle of bringing goods into Canada without
paying duty. Thousands of Canadians use their statutory exemption to bring
goods into Canada duty free every day. Likewise, Binnie J. could not be con-
cerned with the principle that a Canadian would cross the border with a Haude-
nosaunee passport rather than a Canadian passport, as Canadians used to cross
the border regularly with nothing more than a driver's licence.
45
Binnie J. supported his finding of incompatibility by enlarging the scope of
the Mohawk claim so that it was no longer about crossing the border duty free,
but about the "control over the mobility of persons and goods into one coun-
try."46 This kind of expansive approach to defining the issues in dispute can
have an undermining effect on future negotiations. Rather than encouraging
parties to discuss workable accommodations, they will be prompted to articu-
late abstract, general concepts and discuss whether there is any compatibility
between those concepts. In the abstract, compatibility can be elusive, with each
43 Mitchell, supra note 5 at para 164.
44 Ibid. at para 160.
45 Binnie J. was not concerned about the authenticity of the identification provided by a Haude-
nosaunee passport, but rather about the principle that such a passport may symbolize sover-
eignty for the Mohawk people. Border crossings have become more controlled after the events
of September 11, 2001, but this decision was made earlier.
46 Ibid. at para. 160.
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set of hypothetical circumstances adding more complications. The result may
be to drive the parties towards unrealistic or inflexible positions rather than
encouraging energies to be focussed on concrete solutions.
C. Dismissal of attempts to narrow the issue in dispute
The detrimental impact of both these judgments on the subject matter of
negotiations is exacerbated by the fact that both judges dismiss attempts by the
Mohawks to progressively narrow the scope of their claim through the course of
the litigation. The Mohawks had stated at the outset of the trial that they were
not claiming a right to large-scale commercial trade nor to trade in weapons,
alcohol or prohibited drugs. Their claim was for free passage without paying
duty for non-commercial trade with First Nations across Canada based on
Aboriginal rights and the Jay Treaty.
The trial court and the Federal Court of Appeal provided more limited rec-
ognition of the rights. In light of these court decisions, the Mohawks had mod-
ified their position in several ways. They decided not to raise a claim based on
the Jay Treaty limited their claim to free passage, and reduced their trade part-
ners to First Nations in Ontario and Quebec. Whether or not these modifica-
tions were, in the end, acceptable to the Court or the Crown, they were clearly
the type of focussing and narrowing that is encouraged in interest-based negoti-
ations. Rather than accepting the conciliatory gesture and addressing the modi-
fied claim, the Chief Justice resurrected the initial claim for unrestricted
mobility rights47 with unrestricted trade partners.48 She then rejected the
expanded Mohawk claim for being too broad and unfounded.
47 Mitchell, supra note 5 at para.22:
In another attempt at limitation, Chief Mitchell denies that his claim entails
the right to pass freely over the border, i.e., mobility rights. Perhaps recog-
nizing that mobility has become a contentious issue in recent cases [citations
omitted], he answers that his claim is contingent on his existing right to
enter Canada pursuant to the Canadian Charter ofRight and Freedoms and
the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2. He does not seek a right to enter
Canada because he does not require such a right. Again, however, narrowing
the claim cannot narrow the aboriginal practice that defines the claimed
right. An aboriginal right, once established, generally encompasses other
rights necessary to its meaningful exercise.
48 Ibid. at para.20:
It may be tempting for a claimant or a court to tailor the right claimed to
the contours of the specific act at issue. In this case, for example, Chief
Mitchell seeks to limit the scope of his claimed trading rights by designating
specified trading partners. Originally, he claimed the right to trade with
other First Nations in Canada. After the Federal Court of Appeal decision,
he further limited his claim to trade with First Nations in Quebec and
Ontario. These self-imposed limitations may represent part of Chief Mitch-
ell's commendable strategy of negotiating with the government and mini-
mizing the potential effects on its border control. However, narrowing the
claim cannot narrow the aboriginal practice relied upon, which is what
defines the right. The essence of the alleged Mohawk tradition was not to
bring goods across the St. Lawrence River to trade with designated commu-
nities, but rather to simply bring goods to trade. As a matter of necessity,
pre-contact trading partners were confined to other First Nations, but this
historical fact is incidental to the claim - the right to cross the St. Lawrence
River with goods for personal use and trade.
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Binnie J., like the Chief Justice, dismissed the concessions made by the
Mohawks. He too, expanded the scope of the Mohawk claim from the move-
ment of people and goods to a claim for sovereignty. He wrote:
For the reasons already mentioned, the respondent's claim, despite
the concessions made in argument, is not just about physical move-
ment of people or goods in and about Akwesasne. It is about push-
ing the envelope of Mohawk autonomy within the Canadian
Constitution. It is about the Mohawks' aspiration to live as if the
international boundary did not exist. Whatever financial benefit
accrues from the ability to move goods across the border without
payment of duty is clearly incidental to this larger vision.
49
From a dispute resolution perspective, it would be counterproductive to crit-
icize parties who enter into negotiations and then modify their positions in
order to enhance the likelihood of achieving a resolution. The Mitchell decision,
when viewed from this perspective, appears to work against the broader goal of
encouraging First Nations and governments to resolve disputes, where possible,
through the negotiation of detailed and durable agreements.
D. Concern with contemporary implementation
One could argue that the Court did no more than make a decision on the
legal issues raised in the proceeding. McLachlin C.J.'s inquiry into history was
necessary because previous decisions of the Court required such an inquiry in
order to establish the existence of an Aboriginal right. Binnie J.'s inquiry into
compatibility with Canadian sovereignty was necessary in order to establish the
relationship of Aboriginal rights to the Canadian state. A corollary to this argu-
ment would be that the Court did not need to address the issue of prior negoti-
ations because there was so little legal merit in the case that prior negotiations
were not necessary.
Such an argument might be supportable from a narrow technical analysis of
the case. However, the Court has said that the appropriate way to resolve dis-
putes involving Aboriginal peoples is through negotiation. In my view, then, it
is appropriate to scrutinize this decision from a dispute resolution perspective.
As I have indicated above, a dispute resolution analysis shows that the way that
the Court arrived at its decision could have negative impacts on negotiation
processes in general. Such an analysis would also raise doubts about the wisdom
of the Court's decision on the merits of this case.
It is clear that the judges had more on their minds than purely legal princi-
ples. Both judges were also wary of the practical consequences of finding in
favour of the Mohawks. McLachlin C.J. criticizes the Mohawks for attempting
to limit their trading partners to First Nations in Ontario and Quebec, saying,
49 Ibid. at para 125. The broadening of the Mohawk claim by both the Chief Justice and Binnie J.
appears to be a departure from previous statements by the Supreme Court of Canada, that
Aboriginal and treaty rights had to be narrowly and precisely defined. See supra notes 10-21
and accompanying text.
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... it is difficult to imagine how limitations on trading partners
would operate in practice. If Chief Mitchell trades goods to First
Nations in Ontario and Quebec, there is nothing to prevent them
from trading the goods with anyone else in Canada, aboriginal or
not. Thus, the limitations placed on the trading right by Chief
Mitchell and the courts below artificially narrow the claimed right
and would, at any rate, prove illusory in practice.
50
This is a valid concern. However, it is not a concern related directly to the suffi-
ciency of evidence of trade in pre-contact Mohawk society. Rather, it is a concern
with how an Aboriginal right would be implemented in a contemporary context.
Binnie J. also raises a concern with implementation of the Aboriginal right.
The Attorney General for New Brunswick argues that the claimed
aboriginal right really amounts to no more than an aboriginal cross-
border link to facilitate trade in non-aboriginal goods between non-
aboriginal communities. There was, on the evidence, nothing to pre-
vent the Tyendinaga Mohawks from re-selling the goods to non-
natives.
51
Again, the concerns with implementation are valid, but they do not relate directly
to the legal principle on which the decision was based. The fact that there is a pos-
sibility that duty-free goods could be resold illegally is no different than the prob-
lems caused by non-Aboriginal Canadians re-selling goods brought across the
border under their statutory exemption. Yet the mere possibility of re-sale has not
prevented the government from establishing the duty free exemption.
In Mitchell, the Court appears to have been heavily influenced by the poten-
tial practical consequences without having the information necessary in order to
make an informed judgment on those consequences. The real problem here
appears to be with the volume of goods that each Mohawk person could bring
over the border. If that specific problem had been expressly articulated in prior
negotiations, the parties may have been better able to address the issue before
the Court and could perhaps have demonstrated that possible solutions, such as
a quota system, were available. If considered in prior negotiations, the Court
could have been assisted by a discussion of other specific proposals to address a
number of issues including the following:
(i) should there be restrictions on the type or volume of goods to
be traded?
(ii) if the Mohawks were to engage in the small-scale trade con-
templated, what controls could be put into place in order to
monitor that trade? For example, would existing methods for
controlling the sale of tax-free gasoline on reserve to reserve
members be adequate?
(iii) can concerns about smuggling be addressed or would some
50 Ibid. at para.20.
51 Ibid. at para. 94.
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other measures have to be taken to protect against expansion
of smuggling?
The exploration of these technical issues cannot be undertaken by the Court
on its own. The Court needs to have before it developed proposals, which reveal
the strengths and weaknesses of policy options, together with submissions from
the parties on those options. The Court in Delgamuukw recognized this when it
was faced with the claim for self-government. While the policy options were set
out in the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the parties
did not address those options in their submissions. Lamer, C.J. explained that
this is why he was not prepared to comment on the right of self-government.
The broad nature of the claim at trial also led to a failure by the par-
ties to address many of the difficult conceptual issues, which sur-
round the recognition of Aboriginal self-government. The degree of
complexity involved can be gleaned from the Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which devotes 277 pages to the
issue. That report describes different models of self-government,
each differing with respect to their conception of territory, citizen-
ship, jurisdiction, internal government organization, etc. We
received little in the way of submissions that would help us to grap-
ple with these difficult and central issues. Without assistance from
the parties, it would be imprudent for the Court to step into the
breach. In these circumstances, the issue of self-government will fall
to be determined at trial.
52
The structure of the litigation process is not conducive to public policy
development, nor to the development of strategies for the implementation of
rights. Litigation is better suited to examining and testing policies and plans,
which have already been developed. Mr. Justice Sharpe of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, after deciding to stay a decision recognizing Mdtis hunting rights in R.
v. Powley, pointed out the differences between the government's role in design-
ing a regulatory scheme, and the court's role in assessing that scheme.
The design of an appropriate regulatory regime must take a number
of factors into account. In addition to conservation, the s. 35 rights
of the Mdris have to be reconciled with the rights of other aborigi-
nal groups. While aboriginal food hunting rights must be given pri-
ority, the interests of recreational hunters and the tourism industry
are also entitled to consideration. In short, s. 35 Mdtis rights are an
important factor that the government of Ontario must respect in
designing an appropriate regulatory regime, but they are not the
only factor. The courts have an important role in assessing the bal-
ance struck by the government in the design of its regulatory
scheme, but courts cannot design the regulatory scheme.
53
52 Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para. 171.
53 R. v. Powley supra note 2 (Ontario Court of Appeal) at para. 175.
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In Powley the matter came before the Supreme Court of Canada54 . That
Court found that restrictions on provincial hunting licenses infringed the M~tis
right to hunt for food. The province then argued that such an infringement was
justified because of the need for conservation. Because arguments had been
made on the issue of justification, the Supreme Court was in a position to assess
the strength of the evidence. As it turned out, the province had raised the fear of
conservation consequences, but had not shown that the moose population in
that region was, in fact, under any threat. Consequently, the Court could find
that there was no justification for the infringement.
The Court in Powley was able to assess the contemporary consequences of
recognizing an Aboriginal right because the Court had information on justifica-
tion before it. On the other hand, in Mitchell, the Court received submissions
from the Crown about the unworkability of a contemporary exemption from
custom duties, but there is no indication that the Court had before it informa-
tion on whether, in fact, the scheme was unworkable. If this is true, the specula-
tion in Mitchell on the unworkability of any scheme to accommodate Mohawk
interests is unfortunate. While the dangers of an exemption from custom duties
may seem "obvious" when baldly stated by counsel in argument these dangers
may or may not accord with real possibilities. That is why, in attempting to
determine the contemporary impact of an Aboriginal right, it is important to
have the Crown speak to the issue of justification.
W. CONCLUSION
The courts have been urged to make decisions that will facilitate negotia-
tions in current and future disputes over Aboriginal and treaty rights. 55 From a
54 Supra, note 2 (Supreme Court of Canada).
55 K. Roach, "Aboriginal People and the law: Remedies for Violations of Aboriginal Rights"
(1992) 21 Manitoba L. J. 498 at para 86:
Remedies such as temporary interlocutory injunctions to protect Aboriginal
rights, temporary validity of laws that violate Aboriginal rights and declara-
tions about the general nature of Aboriginal rights are manageable remedies
for courts because they do not attempt to provide a final settlement of the
complex problems raised in determining the appropriate relationship
between the First Nations and Canadian governments. They provide tempo-
rary remedies which can induce the parties to negotiate a constitutionally
adequate settlement. Moreover, they respect the purposes of Aboriginal
rights by allowing First Nations to negotiate their relations with Canadian
governments. Such remedies are principled because they do not abdicate the
court's ultimate responsibility, should negotiations and interim remedies
fail, to enforce Aboriginal rights by striking down laws to the extent of their
inconsistency with Aboriginal rights, by awarding damages and by ordering
a wide variety of equitable remedies including structural injunctions and
constructive trusts.
See also Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1996) Vol. 2 ("Restructuring the Relationship"), Part 2 at 564:
Because negotiation is preferable to litigation as a means of resolving disputes between the
Crown and Aboriginal nations, "courts should design their remedies to facilitate negotiations
between First Nations, governments and other affected interests."
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dispute resolution perspective, in order to make decisions, which facilitate
meaningful negotiations, the parties and the courts should attempt to integrate
the role of adjudication with the role of negotiations in a systematic and coher-
ent way.
If the parties can expect to get a better result from the courts by honing the
issues in prior negotiations, it is also true that the courts would enhance the res-
olution dynamic by making decisions, which provide incentives to negotiate
over contemporary accommodations. This shift would have the effect of focus-
sing both negotiations and litigation on the question of whether infringements
can be justified. The Crown would have to tailor its infringements carefully,
and the Aboriginal party would be forced to articulate its aspirations with some
precision. The process would allow the parties, in negotiations, to express their
interests, develop alternative approaches, and focus on a workable solution on
the ground. In the end, if a dispute came before the Court, the Court would be
in a position to determine whether there was a satisfactory process and whether
any of the concrete proposals were appropriate.
It is, of course, not inappropriate for the Court to consider, in any particular
case, the historical origins of claimed rights nor their compatibility with Cana-
dian sovereignty. However, decisions made on those grounds do not have to
preclude an expectation that the parties would have engaged in an attempt to
develop proposals for a workable contemporary accommodation. Such an
approach would not have prevented the Court in the Mitchell case from coming
to the conclusion that it did with respect to the existence of an Aboriginal right
or incompatibility with the national interest. However, there would be signifi-
cant differences at the negotiating table. Parties would have to focus on the con-
crete dimensions of the dispute-in order to have specific proposals to present,
both in the negotiations and before the courts. Focussing on the concrete would
increase the possibility of achieving the negotiated agreements that the Supreme
Court of Canada has consistently encouraged.

